Could macroeconomic factors such as income inequality be the real root cause of financial crises? We explore a broad variety of financial and macroeconomic variables and employ a general-to-specific model selection process to find the most reliable predictors of financial crises in 14 developed countries over a period of more than 100 years. Our in-sample results indicate that income inequality has predictive power beyond loan growth and several other financial variables. Out-of-sample forecasts for individual predictors show that their predictive power tends to vary considerably over time, but income inequality has predictive power in each forecasting period.
Introduction
Financial crises are recurring phenomena in modern economies. The crisis of 2007-2009 was a stark reminder of the treacherous nature of financial crashes because it took almost the whole world by surprise. The search for its underlying causes has consequently revived academic interest in financial crises and their history (see Rajan 2010; Bordo and Meissner 2012; Gorton 2012; Schularick and Taylor 2012, among others) . If a set of useful early warning indicators of financial crises could be identified, the work of economists and policy makers with respect to recognizing and preventing the development of crises would be tremendously facilitated. However, there is no consensus on whether real (macroeconomic) or financial factors play a more important role in predicting financial crises.
On the real side, income inequality has received increasing attention in various areas of economic research, including economic growth, political economy, saving behavior and schooling (Perotti 1993; Benabou 1996; Fishman and Simhon 2002; Dynan et al. 2004; Galor and Moav 2004) . Income inequality was highly elevated before the crisis of 2007-2009 (as it was before the Great Depression), and it has remained high in many developed economies after the crisis (Alvaredo et al. 2013) . Its potential role as a driver of financial crises, however, remains ambiguous. The scant empirical evidence is mixed. Some papers find that income inequality increases the probability of financial crises (Roy and Kemme 2012) or drives credit booms (Perugini et al. 2013; Klein 2015) , whereas others do not find income inequality to be a consistent ingredient in the growth of bank loans (Bordo and Meissner 2012) or the development of financial crises (Atkinson and Morelli 2011) .
On the financial side, Schularik and Taylor (2012) point to credit booms as the primary contributor to financial crises in developed countries over the past 140 years. In a recent paper, Jorda et al. (2014) show that mortgage lending to households in particular has increased considerably over the past century. However, Gorton (2012) links abnormal credit growth to only one out of three financial crises that occurred during the period between 1970 and 2007. Therefore, by themselves, credit booms appear to be insufficient prerequisites of financial crises.
In this study, we take a step toward obtaining a better understanding of the relative roles of real and financial predictors as drivers of financial crises. We evaluate the probability of a financial crisis when considering the predictive power of a broad set of potential financial and macroeconomic factors over a long time series of more than 100 years. Rather than imposing strong a priori restrictions on our empirical model, we employ a general-to-specific model selection process to determine the relevant predictors and their lags.
In addition to income inequality and credit booms, other factors that have been proposed to explain the occurrence of financial crises include collapses of asset bubbles, deregulation, financial innovations, movements of real interest rates, deposit insurance schemes, the growth of the monetary base, and current account imbalances (see Gorton 1988; Calvo et al. 1994; Stoker 1994; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Brunnermeier 2008; Tett 2009; In't Veld et al. 2011) . Po-tential interactions between real and financial factors are evident, particularly in the case of income inequality. Iacoviello (2008) provides compelling evidence that income inequality was the primary driver of the increase in household debt in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) show that inequality can raise leverage in middle-income and poor households as a result of consumption smoothing by borrowing against future incomes. Linking these findings to the credit boom literature implies that income inequality might be the actual real-side root cause of the risk of financial instability that has thus far been fully and directly attributed to credit bubbles. In a similar vein, Rajan (2010) argues that rising inequality caused redistribution in the form of subsidized housing finance, which led to the housing boom and the subsequent crash.
Our paper is based on a dataset of 14 developed countries over the period provided by Schularik and Taylor (2012) . However, our study differs from their work in two important ways. First, we allow the predictive power to be distributed among a considerably larger set of variables and examine these potential predictors and their lags in joint models. Second, we employ a methodology that allows for a more flexible general-to-specific model selection between different predictors without imposing restrictive assumptions on the channels through which, e.g., income inequality impacts the risk of financial crises. More specifically, we begin with (the year-to-year change in) the top 1% income share as our measure of income inequality, real bank loans, gross real investments, the real current account balance, broad money (M2), gross real government debt, the real price of stocks, short-term real interest rates and six lags of each factor. We also add a dummy variable indicating when a deposit insurance scheme was introduced. 1 In each step of our empirical analysis, we then apply a general-to-specific model selection procedure to obtain the most parsimonious choice of variables that provides the most predictive information on the probability of a financial cri-sis. In addition, we employ various out-of-sample forecasting techniques to assess the robustness of our in-sample results.
Our results suggest that the drivers of financial crises tend to vary in time and between crises. Although we find evidence, as in Schularik and Taylor (2012) , that credit booms play a significant role in creating financial instability, our results highlight that other factors play at least an equally important role.
Specifically, our empirical analysis yields four main findings. First, income inequality is an influential factor in our in-sample results: the top 1% income share (our measure of income inequality) has the highest individual predictive power and yields additional predictive power over and above the previously used factors, such as real bank loans, when included in a joint model. Second, the role of bank loans as an in-sample predictor of financial crises diminishes considerably when jointly controlling for several other factors. Third, multivariable recursive out-ofsample results underpin the importance of using various predictive variables in the model. Fourth, studying our predictors individually in out-of-sample forecasts for different time periods shows that income inequality yields individual predictive power in each forecasting period but that the predictive power of most factors tends to vary considerably over time. This finding implies that focusing on shorter time periods may lead to incomplete conclusions regarding the drivers of financial crises.
The focus of this paper is on the long time series, which we exploit to achieve a maximally comprehensive picture of the roles of various real and financial factors in predicting crises in general and to determine whether and how these roles vary among different crises. The long time series is also essential for performing out-of-sample forecasts. This long-term focus comes at a cost: some factors that have potentially gained importance since the 1980s, when financial liberalization began, must be neglected because the data for the indicators of financial innovation and deregulation are available only for comparatively short time periods.
However, we examine an in-sample robustness check for the 1962-2008 period, for which we have available data on the size of the US mutual fund industry as an indicator of investments in innovative and potentially riskier investment classes.
The results confirm the full-sample findings. In addition, the results show that a larger US mutual fund industry increases the risk of a financial crisis, but only immediately before a crisis erupts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and how it motivates our choice of predictor variables and our data.
Section 3 outlines the methodology, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Financial Crises and Their Predictors

Predictors of Financial Crises
In his seminal paper, Gorton (1988) links the systemic nature of banking panics to the business cycle. One of the strongest signals of an upcoming recession is a decline in investment expenditures (Zarnowitz and Moore 1982; De Long and Summers 1991; Crowder and de Jong 2011) . Investment expenditures also reflect the level of aggregate demand for capital goods in the economy. In addition, the nature of investments might influence the probability of a crisis (see Schularik and Taylor 2012) . If the money available in an economy is invested productively rather than driving consumption or speculation, then it should lower the risk that a crisis will occur. Therefore, we account for the change in real gross investments in our empirical analysis.
The idea that financial crises are driven by credit boom and bust cycles has long been stipulated in the literature (Minsky 1977; Kindleberger 1978) . Additionally, recent studies have found that large credit booms are associated with financial crises (Bordo et al. 2001; Mendoza and Terrones 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularik and Taylor 2012) . The increased leverage and the potential concurrent decrease in lending standards introduce fragilities into the banking system and make it vulnerable. We measure the evolution of credit in each country by the change in real bank loans. We do not scale bank loans by GDP because such a scaled measure may proxy for the nature of the financial system (bank-based vs.
market-based) rather than proxying for the risk of a financial crisis in our sample of developed economies (Barrell et al. 2010 ).
As Claessens et al. (2010) document, one of the similarities between previous financial crises and the recent crisis is that they are preceded by asset price booms.
Increased asset prices may lead to an increase in lending against higher collateral values, which in turn further increases asset prices. Once this spiral of activity stops, households and firms struggle to pay back their accumulated debt. This type of asset price boom, which eventually threatens the stability of the financial system, could be observed in the US and in many European countries in the runup to the recent crisis. In contrast, the tech bubble at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s did not result in a massive systemic financial crisis. In our empirical analysis, we account for asset price booms by the change in the real value of stock market indexes. 2 Current account imbalances and short-term interest rates may also contribute to the development of financial crises. A current account deficit implies that the economy consumes more than it produces such that other countries lend their savings to this economy. Such capital inflows may lead to stock market bubbles and the excessive expansion of domestic credit and may cause inflationary pressures (Calvo et al. 1994) . We use the change in the real value of the current account as a measure of international capital flows. Jorda et al. (2014) show that environments with low interest rates lead to an increase in mortgage lending and housing price booms and ultimately lead to financial instability. In contrast, increasing interest rates can hurt banks' balance sheets if banks cannot quickly increase their lending rates. Alternatively, if an interest rate increase can be passed on to borrowers, such an action can increase the number of non-performing loans and the risk of moral hazard on the borrowers' side (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). In our empirical analysis, we account for the real short-term interest rate.
Recently, a growing body of literature has developed theories and arguments as to how income inequality can contribute to financial instability and thereby increase the likelihood of a crisis through various channels, such as credit and asset price booms or current account imbalances. These channels emphasize that asset and credit bubbles might actually develop as a result of real causes. Rajan (2010) argues that rising inequality forced US politicians to enact measures to better the situation of low-and middle-income households to avoid losing them as voters. Because redistribution in the form of social security payments or increased taxes for the rich are impossible solutions in the US political environment, redistribution in the form of subsidized housing finance was expedited. This provision of inexpensive mortgage lending together with the concurrent deregulation of the financial sector in turn led to the observed housing boom and the subsequent crash. Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) model a more direct link between income inequality and increasing debt levels that does not rely on a specific political system. In their closed-economy model, crises emerge endogenously as a result of rising income inequality because low-income and middle-income households seeking to maintain their levels of consumption must borrow more as their real wages decrease. Extending the model to an international environment with open economies, Kumhof et al. (2012) show that rising inequality increases the risk of financial crises because it endogenously leads to credit expansion, increased leverage and increased current account deficits. 3 Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) argue that income inequality leads to depressed aggregate demand, which induces central banks to maintain low interest rates, 3 See also Seppecher and Salle (2015) . thereby contributing to the accumulation of private debt. Simultaneously, those who benefit from increasing inequality search for high-yield investments and drive asset bubbles. The increase in non-performing loans after the burst of the asset bubble then exposes the banking sector to the risk of a run. Similarly, Stockhammer (2013) suggests that increased income inequality leads to more speculation or risk-taking because the consumption opportunities of those benefiting from increasing incomes become exhausted, and speculative investments become more likely. Atkinson and Morelli (2011) argue that banks also take higher risks when income inequality is elevated and that this risk-taking occurs through securitization. In our empirical analysis, we measure income inequality using the top 1% income share of the population.
To complete our pool of potential crisis predictors, we use three additional variables that have been shown to help predict financial crises in previous studies. First, central banks can steer aggregate credit through monetary aggregates. 4 We control for the potential impact of monetary aggregates on the probability of a financial crisis using the change in broad money (M2). Second, government debt is relevant to the financial sector (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). A government that is short of funds may postpone measures aimed at strengthening banks' balance sheets. However, even if a government is prepared to support the country's banking sector despite budgetary problems, the public might not trust such an endeavor, which could in turn trigger a bank run. Third, deposit insurance is typically designed and introduced to prevent depositors from running and thereby threatening the stability of the financial system. Meanwhile, the existence of deposit insurance introduces a moral hazard on the bank managers' side because they have an incentive to increase their risk-taking, knowing that the deposit insurance scheme will pay depositors if the risky investments go bad. Deposit insurance may therefore actually increase the likelihood of financial crises despite its intended stabilizing effect (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). In our analysis, deposit insurance is a binary variable that equals one in all years in which a country has an active deposit insurance scheme.
Data
Our primary source of data is the dataset compiled by Schularik and Taylor (2012) .
These data cover 14 developed countries over the period from 1870 to 2008.
The countries included are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. For the dependent variable, we use the financial crisis episodes collected by Schularik and Taylor (2012) , who combine the datasets of 
In other words,
there is a financial crisis in country i at time t, 0, otherwise .
(1)
Financial crises are defined as periods in which a country's banking sector experiences runs, sharp increases in default rates accompanied by large losses of capital leading to government interventions, bankruptcy, or forced mergers of financial institutions (see Schularik and Taylor (2012) for details on the crisis data compilation). We assume that a crisis begins (i.e., y it = 1) in the year when a country falls into the crisis.
We also obtain data on real bank loans, broad money (M2), government debt, and stock market indexes from Schularik and Taylor (2012) . In addition, we obtain data on investments and current account deficits from Taylor (2002) Our data on the top 1% income share come from the Top Income Database by Alvaredo et al. (2013) . We use the top 1% income share for two reasons. First, calculating synthetic indexes such as the Gini or Theil index requires accurate country-specific information, such as the mean household (or person) income of a country. Such indexes may be unreliable because their calculation often ignores the fact that the underlying data contain inconsistencies and anomalies that are likely to be country-dependent (Piketty 2014) . In contrast, the top income share measure is constructed using the same raw data and methodology for every country (Piketty 2007) . 5 Second, the top 1% income share data are available for a time span of approximately 100 years for most of our sample countries, while the synthetic indexes generally cover only the past 40 years and often contain missing observations for several years. Because financial crises are an infrequent phenomenon in developed economies, using synthetic indexes would restrict our analysis considerably and might lead to incomplete conclusions. The focus of our study is instead on the long term to gain a fully comprehensive picture of the (potentially varying) roles of different financial and real factors in the run-up to different crises. Table 1 shows the number of observations available for each of our predictor variables, emphasizing that our panel is unbalanced. We address this issue in the empirical analysis by studying various subsample periods that yield more balanced panels. Table 1 also provides summary statistics for all predictive variables.
In this section, we describe the fixed-effects panel logit model and the model selection process used throughout this study. Given that our dependent variable is binary, it is meaningful to rely on binary response models rather than on the panel models designed for continuous dependent variables. The latter models have various problems in the binary-dependent framework. For example, the financial crisis probabilities do not necessarily fall within the unit interval. In the model, we allow country-fixed effects to control for all time-invariant heterogeneity at the country level. Such a model specification has the additional advantage that our results are derived from within-country variation in the crisis predictors, eliminating any potential bias that stems from different data-reporting standards in different countries.
Our basic model is essentially the same as that used by Schularik and Taylor (2012) (see a more complete description of the model in Hsiao (2003, Chapter 7) ), but our model selection approach and our multivariable analysis differ considerably from theirs. We employ a methodology that allows for a more flexible general-to-specific model selection between different predictors without imposing restrictive assumptions on the channels through which, e.g., income inequality impacts the risk of financial crises. We also allow the predictive power to be distributed among a considerably larger set of variables and examine these potential predictors and their lags in joint models.
Logit Model
In the fixed-effects panel logit model (hereafter, logit model), conditional on the information set at time t − 1 (denoted by F t−1 ) including, e.g., the relevant predictive variables, y it has a Bernoulli distribution:
ity that y it takes the value 1 (i.e., that there is a financial crisis at time t in country i) can be written as
where π it is a linear function of variables included in the information set F t−1 , and Λ(·) is a logistic cumulative distribution function:
Following Schularik and Taylor (2012), we assume that the linear function π it has the form
where b j (L)x jit = b j1 x ji,t−1 + . . . + b jp x ji,t−p , j = 1, . . . , K, and the country-specific vector ω i includes all the deterministic terms (such as country-specific dummy variables), reflecting the possible heterogeneity between countries. In model (5), the lag-polynomials for different predictors have the form
where L is the usual lag operator (i.e., L k z t = z t−k ). In other words, we explicitly allow the possibility that the predictive power of different predictors is distributed among several lags. Note that using the same lag length p in (6) for all predictors is only for notational convenience and can easily be relaxed in practice (see Section 3.2). Notably, the polynomial (6) begins with lag one (i.e., only the lags of the predictors are included in (5)).
The logit model can be conveniently estimated by using the maximum like-lihood (ML) method. Using the conditional probabilities constructed in (3), one can write the likelihood function and obtain the ML estimates using numerical methods (see details, e.g., from Hsiao (2003), pp. 194-199) . In our setup, the number of cross-sectional units (countries) N is small, whereas the length of the time series T is relatively long. Because the model is not necessarily specified correctly, the ML estimator can be interpreted as a quasi-maximum-likelihood estimator in the usual way. Therefore, to account for this possible misspecification, we use robust standard errors for the estimated coefficients throughout this study.
Model Selection and Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation
Because our panel data are highly unbalanced, we need to pay special attention to the model selection throughout the analysis. In particular, depending on the predictive variables included in the model, the number of observations differs across different model specifications. Therefore, the usual information criterion-based model selection procedures are not straightforwardly applicable. Nevertheless, using an unbalanced panel is common in the previous crisis prediction literature because such a panel includes as much information as possible given that different variables are available over different time spans (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Barrell et al. 2010; Schularik and Taylor 2012) .
The model selection employed in this study can be divided into two parts.
First, we are interested in examining which predictive variables should be included in the model. Second, we need to determine for each variable how many lags p (see (5) and (6)) have useful predictive power. In practice, the (optimal) lag lengths p for different predictors are unknown. However, assuming that the upper bound, e.g., p max , is known, we can use the following sequential generalto-specific model selection method, which is essentially the same as the procedure
proposed by researchers such as Lï¿ 1 2 tkepohl (2007, pp. 143-144) for vector autoregressive models. We begin with a large model containing all the explanatory variables and their lags. To maintain a lag structure and thus predictive model that are as parsimonious as possible, we consider lags up to six (i.e., p max = 6) for each variable. After the parameters have been estimated, we examine the t-ratios of all variables at lag six. We reduce the lag length of any variable by one if the t-ratio associated with the longest lag coefficient is less than 1.65. We continue this procedure until all the t-ratios for the remaining longest lags are larger than this threshold.
The predictive performance of the model is evaluated using two well-known goodness-of-fit measures. For the binary dependent variables, various alternative measures are roughly analogous to the coefficient of determination R 2 used in linear models. As in Schularik and Taylor (2012) , one such alternative is McFadden's pseudo-R 2 measure, given as
In this expression, L u is the maximum value of the estimated unconstrained loglikelihood function, and L c is its constrained counterpart in a model that contains only a constant term. The form of (7) ensures that the values 0 and 1 correspond to "no fit" and "perfect fit," respectively, and that the intermediate values have
roughly the same interpretation that R 2 has in linear models.
Another evaluation criterion used in this study is the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve methodology is a common evaluation criterion for binary predictions and outcomes in other sciences. In addition to Schularik and Taylor (2012) , recent examples of economic and financial applications include Berge and Jorda (2011) and Jorda and Taylor (2011) .
Specifically in our application, the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) is used to evaluate each model's ability to distinguish between signals for financial crises y it = 1 and normal periods y it = 0. Let us denoteŷ it = 1 as a signal forecast for a crisis if the probability forecasts (3) obtained with the logit model are p it > c for some threshold value c, and vice versa forŷ it = 0. The ROC curve describes all possible combinations of the true positive rate T PR(c) = P(ŷ it = 1|y it = 1) and the false positive rate FPR(c) = P(ŷ it = 1|y it = 0) that arise as one varies the probability threshold c. The threshold c is allowed to vary from 0 to 1; the ROC curve is traced out in T PR(c)&FPR(c) space describing the classification ability of the model. In our application, in which financial crisis periods are rare, the determination of a single threshold c is complicated. Hence, we believe that the ROC methodology is more sensible than a method concentrating on the results based on one particular cutoff c.
To summarize the classification ability of a given model, the AUROC is a wellknown summary statistic. The value of AUROC=0.5 corresponds to a coin toss (i.e., the model has no predictive power at all). In contrast, the value 1 signifies a perfect fit. Overall, a higher value indicates superior classification ability.
Results
We begin our empirical analysis with in-sample estimations, the objective of which All our estimated models contain country-fixed effects to control for timeinvariant heterogeneity at the country level and to focus the analysis on withincountry variation. We do not include time-fixed effects in our panel logit model because the resulting model could be estimated only using the years in which the dependent variable actually changes values. Given that financial crises are rather rare events in developed economies, we would lose most observations with such a procedure.
Full Sample Predictions
We first estimate the fixed-effects logit model using one predictive variable at a time. We select the optimal lag length p for each variable using the sequential testing approach outlined in Section 3.2. Table 2 reports the full sample results.
For each predictor, the table displays the optimal lag length and the values of the pseudo-R 2 and the AUROC. The number of observations differs for various predictors based on data availability. Table 2 shows that the optimal lag length varies between two and five lags (with six lags being the maximum that we studied). Two exceptions are the shortterm real interest rate and the indicator of whether a deposit insurance scheme is in place; as single predictors, these do not have statistically significant predictive power at any lag length. Table 2 also shows that our measure of income inequality (the top 1% income share) clearly yields the best performance: income inequality appears to have substantial predictive power for financial crises. Real bank loans constitute the second-best single predictor, with the second-highest pseudo-R 2 and AUROC. Overall, the pseudo-R 2 level is not very high in any model, partly reflecting the limited number of financial crises. However, the AUROC statistics obtained are well above 0.5 for all predictors, indicating that the models can distinguish between non-crisis and crisis periods. In the next step, we use a multi-predictor analysis to examine which of the effects survives the joint inclusion of various predictors in one model. For example, some of the financial variables may actually present the channels through which the real factors predict financial crises. Based on the previous literature and the results in Table 2 , we continue our analysis by focusing on models that contain both real bank loans and income inequality. Table 3 reports the results for the full sample period. 6 Columns 1 and 2 include the models containing real bank loans and the top 1% income as predictors separately. These two models replicate the Table 2 results of these two predictors, but we now present the actual estimated coefficients of all included lags, facilitating a comparison with the model containing both predictors (column 3).
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that both variables are also significant predictors of financial crises in a joint model. The separate tests for the predictive power of the lags of the variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and are similar to the univariate results reported in columns 1 and 2. The values of the pseudo-R 2 and the AUROC in this joint specification are larger than in the single variable models. Thus, income inequality indeed appears to have additional predictive power over and above bank loans (i.e., it does not merely affect the probability of a financial crisis via its possible impact on credit growth).
In column 4 of Table 3 , we interact real bank loans and the top 1% income share to test whether income inequality and loan growth are indeed reinforcing drivers of crises, as suggested by Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) .
We report only the first lag of the interaction term because it appears that the other lags do not significantly predict a crisis. The interaction term is significantly positive, and both main effects are also significantly positive, implying that loan growth is more likely to lead to a crisis when income inequality is high and vice versa.
Despite the evidence above, income inequality may still work through various other channels. In the next step, we augment the two-variable model presented in Table 3 with the additional predictors introduced in Section 2, which have been identified by the previous literature as playing an important role. Again following the general-to-specific model selection method introduced in Section 3.2, we first add all our remaining predictive variables and their lags from one to six to the model presented in the last column of Table 3 . Then, we sequentially exclude the longest lag in each step until its t-ratio is larger in absolute value than 1.65. The resulting model is presented in Table 4 . Table 4 remain qualitatively unchanged if bank loans are excluded from the model (results are available upon request). This result is in contrast to the evidence presented by Schularik and Taylor (2012) , who find a strong role of loan growth when employing the same dataset that we use. However, in contrast to our study, those researchers do not employ as great a variety of predictors and lags in a joint model that is derived from a general-to-specific model selection process.
Table 4 also shows that factors beyond the change in income inequality have predictive power over and above loan growth. As expected, the probability of financial crises increases for countries that run current account deficits. The negative first lag of real stocks (as also found by Schularik and Taylor (2012) ) indicates that once an asset price boom begins to revert, the probability of a financial crisis increases. However, monitoring the long-term evolution of stock prices does not appear to be a useful tool for policy makers to predict financial crises well in advance. Furthermore, we do not find a significant effect of real short-term interest rates, perhaps because they affect credit growth and, through this channel, increase the likelihood of a financial crisis rather than having direct predictive power.
In conclusion, the full sample results show that an increase in income inequality increases the probability of financial crises. This finding is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that both of the two fiercest crises in the US, the Great Depression and the recent crisis, were preceded by high income inequality. This result also confirms the reasoning in the academic literature that income inequality is one of the causes of financial crises and rejects the suggestion that income inequality works solely through credit booms, as suggested by Kumhof and Ranciere (2010), Perugini et al. (2013) and Klein (2015) . However, the full sample results also emphasize that the predictive power in the models is clearly distributed among various predictors and their lags.
Subsample Predictions
In this section, we present the results of two robustness tests. First, we replicate our previous analysis for the post-WW2 sample to examine whether the predictive power of the real and financial variables depends on the sample period. The post-WW2 period provides an important robustness check because Schularik and Taylor (2012) find "two eras of financial capitalism" when they study money and credit before and after WW2. Additionally, some of our predictor variables, particularly the top 1% income share, are available only for a shorter time span. The panel is therefore much more balanced in the post-WW2 analysis, which eases the comparison of effects between different variables. Second, we study two further channels through which income inequality may have an impact on financial crises: housing price booms (Rajan 2010 ) and increased risk-taking by higherincome households (Stockhammer 2013) . Because indicators for both channels are available for much shorter time periods than those employed in our primary analysis, we perform this robustness test using our shortest sample period, which covers the years from 1962 to 2008.
One concern with our previous results might be that the top 1% income share has superior predictive performance because the sample period of this variable is so different from the sample period of the other variables. In Table 5, Table 4 ). The primary differences are that the existence of deposit insurance has predictive power in the post-WW2 sample, whereas the short-term interest rates do not. The introduction of deposit insurance increases the likelihood of the outbreak of a financial crisis, indicating that the inherent moral hazard problems may interfere with the intended stabilizing effects of deposit insurance. The potentially destabilizing effect of deposit insurance has long been discussed in the literature: Keely (1990) , Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Anginer et al. (2014) , among others, find evidence of such an effect. In addition, consistent with the finding by Schularik and Taylor (2012) that the share of credit in the economy has increased after WWII, Table 6 suggests that credit booms play a more important role in the second half of our observation period, with the lags of real bank loans being jointly statistically significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, income inequality is an equally strong predictor as it is in the full sample analysis. 7
Our results thus far are indicative that income inequality is a contributing factor to financial crises over and above credit growth, current account deficits, real interest rates and stock price booms. However, as we outlined in Section 2, income inequality can also have an effect on the development of a crisis through housing price booms (Rajan 2010) and increased investment in risky assets by high-income households (Stockhammer 2013 asset classes, we use data on the size of the US mutual fund industry (total assets held in mutual funds as a share of total CRSP market capitalization) collected from the CRSP Mutual Funds Data, which is available from 1962 onward. We estimate a restricted-form model beginning with only those variables through which income inequality is expected to affect the likelihood of crises. That is, the model includes real bank loans, housing prices, the size of US mutual funds, real stocks, and current accounts, in addition to the top 1% income share. We follow the same general-to-specific model selection approach used above. 8 The results in Table 7 show that when we control for these different channels through which income inequality may affect the likelihood of financial crises, it 7 To broaden our view, we re-examine the post-WWII analysis using the income share received by the top decile (10%) as an alternative measure of income inequality (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty 2014) . The results are similar to those for the top 1% income share and are available upon request. Because the top 10% income share series are basically unavailable for the pre-WWII period, we do not use them in our primary analysis.
8 None of the lags of housing prices has statistically significant explanatory power, and thus, this variable is excluded from the final estimation results presented in Table 7 . In contrast, Jorda et al. (2014) find some predictive power for housing prices but in a model with fewer other control variables. In our model, the individual predictive power of real housing prices is rather high (AUROC=0.81), but its coefficient becomes statistically non-significant after the top 1% income share is added to the regression. The individual predictive power of US mutual funds is also high (AUROC=0.65).
still has unilateral predictive power, although its effect is somewhat diminished.
In addition, the results show that a larger US mutual fund industry increases the risk of a financial crisis, but only immediately before a crisis erupts. Longer lags are negatively related to the probability of a financial crisis, which might indicate that an increase in mutual fund investments actually stabilizes a financial system for a certain time, possibly because of the funds' diversification effects, but a crisis becomes more likely when investments continue growing. Such a process would increase the difficulty of using the growth of risky investments as a coherent warning signal for crises.
In summary, our in-sample results suggest that credit growth plays a role in predicting financial crises, as highlighted by previous studies. It is a good univariate predictor and has statistically significant predictive power in a multi-predictor setting for the post-WW2 period. However, we do not find an effect of credit growth in the multivariable full sample estimations. Meanwhile, in contrast to some of the previous literature, our results highlight an explicit role of income inequality as a crisis predictor in all subperiods and specifications. One possible reason that our results partially differ from those of previous studies is that we employ general-to-specific model selection that begins with a variety of real and financial factors and their lags. This process makes our procedure less restrictive.
In general, we conclude that the power to predict financial crises is distributed among several variables and their lags.
Out-of-Sample Forecasting Performance: 1980-2008
The estimation results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that it is possible to obtain statistically significant in-sample predictive power for financial crisis periods in different developed countries. Thus far, our primary interest has been to examine which financial and macroeconomic variables are useful crisis predictors in general. Next, we turn to exploring out-of-sample forecasts for the recent crisis periods.
Similar to Schularik and Taylor (2012) , we consider rolling regressions using the lagged data to forecast financial crisis periods during the period from 1980 to 2008. A given model is estimated using data from the beginning of the sample to time T using the information set F T to construct one-year-ahead probability forecasts (see (3)) for the observations y i,T +1 , i = 1, . . . , N. This procedure is repeated for each year through the end of the sample. This type of analysis leads to a more realistic comparison of the predictive ability of different variables and models because no future data are included in the information set when estimating the parameters of the models. 9 This exercise can therefore also be regarded as a robustness check against the potential overfitting of the logit models considered in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Table 8 reports the forecasting results. We use the out-of-sample AUROC as the criterion to assess forecasting performance because of the lack of a widely used out-of-sample version of the pseudo-R 2 measure. However, we note that the AUROC criterion and related tests are originally designed for in-sample analyses, and their out-of-sample results should therefore be interpreted as indicating tendencies in the predictive power of variables. Column 1 of Table 8 shows the AUROC for the full sample of 14 countries over the entire observation period, while column 2 focuses on the "common sample" that consists of the same observations used for all models. 10 The first seven rows of the table report the results for each individual predictor variable. The results show that loan growth performs best out-of-sample, independent of the estimation sample that we consider. In contrast to the in-sample findings, the top 1% income share does not perform as well when used as a sole 9 However, we note that real-time data are often unavailable, i.e., data for different variables may be released with a time lag.
10 The sample is limited by the variable that has the fewest observations, which is the top 1% income share, such that every estimation uses the same time dimension. However, the sample is not balanced because some variables have missing observations in some years. Again, Canada and the Netherlands are excluded from this analysis.
predictor. This picture changes, however, when we employ the joint model from Table 4 in the out-of-sample analysis, as presented in the bottom four rows of Table 8. 11 First, it is important to note that these models yield superior forecasting accuracy compared with any single predictor. This finding confirms the importance of using various predictive variables in forecasting financial crises. Meanwhile, loan growth loses its predominant role when we control for other obviously important financial and real factors. The model without real bank loans leads to a smaller loss in terms of the out-of-sample AUROC compared with the model excluding the top 1% income share. This diminishing role of loan growth when we control for various other predictive factors is consistent with the in-sample results reported in Table 4 . When the common sample is used, the difference between real bank loans and the top 1% income share becomes negligible.
Out-of-Sample Performance: Varying Forecasting Periods
The selection of the forecasting period may affect our out-of-sample results obtained in Section 4.3. In particular, the era beginning in the early 1980s is commonly referred to as the period of financial liberation, marked by a phenomenal rise in the share of bank assets to GDP (Singh 1997; Schularik and Taylor 2012) . This trend may have increased the predictive power of real bank loans.
In Section 4.3, the model specifications and the lag lengths of the predictors are based on the model selection results obtained for the full sample period. In this section, by contrast and as a robustness check, we consider different forecasting periods, with the lag lengths specifically selected for each period using the data up to the starting point of the forecasting sample. For instance, for the 1950-2008 period, the model selection and parameter estimation are conducted using the sample period through 1949. Again, these results should be interpreted with caution because some forecasting periods contain few crises. For this reason, we consider models with only one predictor in this analysis. However, our results thoroughly reflect the types of crises occurring during the various periods, such that our models appear to yield satisfactory forecasting results.
The Table 9 In conclusion, our out-of-sample forecasting results underpin the importance of focusing on various real and financial variables and assessing various forecasting periods to understand the drivers of financial crises.
Conclusions
This paper studies the performance of various financial and macroeconomic variables when predicting financial crisis periods using an extensive dataset covering In particular, we can conclude that in the run-up to a crisis, several variables have substantial additional predictive power over and above credit booms, as recently emphasized by Schularick and Taylor (2012) . We introduce income inequality into the range of potential crisis predictors -a factor that has received considerable attention in various strands of economic literature but has been scarcely studied as a driver of financial crises. We find that income inequality is indeed a useful predictor; it performs better than bank loans in in-sample estimations, and it is a universal predictor in out-of-sample forecasts, although bank loans perform better during some out-of-sample forecasting periods. The out-of-sample forecasts also emphasize that focusing on short subperiods yields considerably varying results for several factors, such as government debt, which might lead to incomplete conclusions regarding the usefulness of a certain predictor. Table 1 and Section 2. The underlying forecast horizon is one year. The lag length is selected using the model selection procedure introduced in Section 3.2. (None) implies that none of the lags were selected in the employed model selection procedure. Notes: This table contains the full sample estimation results of logit models when several predictors and their lags are examined jointly. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. x t = x t−1 ). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction between the first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R 2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of the lags of the included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Table 1 and Section 2. The underlying forecast horizon is one year. The lag length is selected using the model selection procedure introduced in Section 3.2. (None) implies that none of the lags were selected in the employed model selection procedure. Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. x t = x t−1 ). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction between the first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R 2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of the lags of the included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. estimation results of logit models when several predictors and their lags are examined jointly. Four countries are excluded because of a lack of data. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Lk denotes the kth lag of the variable (i.e., L1. x t = x t−1 ). L1. top 1%*r. bank loans is the interaction between the first lags of our indicators for income inequality and credit growth. The results for the goodness-of-fit measures (Pseudo-R 2 and AUROC) and the test statistics for the joint significance of the lags of the included explanatory variables are also reported. Furthermore, *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the estimated parameter coefficients and the test statistics at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The first seven rows report results from models that include only one single predictor at a time, whereas the full model refers to the model presented in Table 4 and its subsequent restricted versions. The common sample refers to a sample that is limited by the variable with the fewest observations, which is the top 1% income share. However, the sample is not balanced because some variables have missing observations for some years. Table 9 : Out-of-sample AUROCs for different sample periods Model 1980 Model -2008 Model 1950 Model -2008 Model 1990 Model -2008 Model 1990 Model -2000 Model 2000 Model -2008 The analysis is conducted with a common sample (see above). "-" indicates that none of the lags of a variable were statistically significant in the model selection.
